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THE CHANGING FACE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
AND THE PRACTICAL LAWYER
WARREN H. ALBRECHT, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Standing beside products liability and comparative negligence
law, employment law forms the third arm of a grand trilogy that
has transformed American civil law in the last two decades. Each
of these arms is unique, but employment law is different still. It is
not just a matter of recognizing an obvious wrong and the progres-
sive fashioning of new remedies. The area of employment law is
dissimilar in that it raises provocative questions of industrial and
personal justice and of economic utility and equity. Employment
disputes do not easily fit into neat categories. They require courts
of law to engage in thoughtful consideration of socioeconomic
impact and freedom of contract.
The "at-will" concept-that an employee can be discharged
for no cause at all-survives, although in a form markedly at vari-
ance with the employment atmosphere of even a decade ago.
Through an expanded pace of judicial activity, all states now have
a full range of reported decisions in the arena of wrongful dis-
charge. The scale of this judicial activity reflects an early liberal
bent followed by a certain retrenchment. The earlier movement
to strengthen the status of the employee at every turn has been
balanced with the recognition that courts of law must come to
terms with the distasteful prospect of monitoring every adverse
management decision.
The employment law revolution essentially began in the late
1970s. By the early to mid-1980s, employers and courts of law
were staggering under a plethora of wrongful discharge cases, and
each day brought new limitations to the perceived rights of
employers to run the workplace as they thought best. Riding the
at-will horse for so long had calloused some employers against the
painful personal consequences of employee termination. Egre-
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gious factual circumstances gave courts of law the moral incentive
to protect employees where they might otherwise have declined.
The law of wrongful discharge and its attendant claims for relief
became the labor law issue of the 1980s.
Within the space of a decade, a new class of lawyers and
human resources specialists was spawned, becoming an integral
part of corporate America. It became a natural way of life for at
least the more sophisticated and larger companies to insulate
themselves beforehand from this type of litigation. Some did it
better than others but, on the whole, the American employee has
become better off as a result of this legal revolution. Whether it is
because some employees are of a protected class or because
employers are increasingly subject to adverse litigation, employees
have increasingly found themselves to be beneficiaries of wiser
decisions on the part of their employers.
Other commentators have thoroughly investigated the histori-
cal antecedents to the at-will doctrine, which has dominated the
employment arena for a century or more. Whether the rise of the
doctrine may have been based on erroneous deductions from
Anglo-American legal precedent will not be discussed here. The
practical lawyer begins with the premise that, in our capitalistic
society, an individual employed for an indefinite period of time,
without a contract to the contrary, will be considered employed at
the will of his employer; this premise remains a fixed concept of
American law.
It is the judicial obligation of each reporting jurisdiction to
provide the public with precedent and settled concepts of law.
This obligation is doubly important in the area of employment law
because employers and employees both need guidance to which
they can look for the myriad of decisions that must be made in the
workplace. For many jurisdictions, including North Dakota,
employment disputes existed in a vacuum. But now, drawing
upon precedent from other jurisdictions, an adequate supply of
cases has been presented to the North Dakota Supreme Court so
that North Dakota practitioners and their clients may better com-
prehend the rights and limitations present when there is strife in
the workplace. This article discusses the principal claims for relief
and the defenses available in private industry in North Dakota and
elsewhere, and the practical ramifications for the employee,
employer, and lawyer. The article is limited to tort and contract
actions that fall under the frequently used heading of "wrongful
discharge." Statutory remedies available to the private or public
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employee are beyond the scope of this article, yet the common law
theories discussed here may apply to public employees as well.
II. THE CONTRACT
The heart and soul of an employment dispute is the contract.
It is the essential item with which the practitioner must be familiar
before the client, either employee or employer, can be adequately
advised.
It is not the fact that there is a simple employment contract in
place which gives rise to employee rights.' Rather, it is the terms
of the contract to which attention must be directed. The standard
hiring is a placement with no agreed-upon terms other than the
duties and the wages to be earned. When the parties understand
that this is for an indefinite period of time, and there are no other
special terms favorable to the employee, the employment is at the
will of either party.2 In such a case, there is no condition placed
upon an adverse employment action by the employer. As stated
by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Sand v. Queen City
Packing Co.,' "[i]n the absence of a statute to the contrary, an
employer has the right to discharge his employees for or without
cause . . . ."' Thus, the employer has an "unimpaired" right to
terminate the employment at will when the employee is unable to
present a constitutional or statutory violation or is unable to show
express terms to the contrary.5
A. ORAL PROMISES AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The lawyer for either side should inquire into the form and
substance of any promises made by the employer to the employee.
The practitioner should conduct a basic investigation of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the alleged oral representation,
because under some circumstances suits based upon such repre-
sentations have been successful.6
1. In North Dakota, a contract of employment is defined as "a contract by which one,
who is called the employer, engages another, who is called the employee, to do something
for the benefit of the employer or of a third person." N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-01 (1987).
2. Wood v. Buchanan, 72 N.D. 216, __, 5 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1942). North Dakota has
provided by statute that "[an employment having no specified term may be terminated at
the will of either party on notice to the other ...." N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (1987).
Almost all other jurisdictions have historically recognized the at-will rule. See generally 1
L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1990) (state-by-state analysis).
3. 108 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1961).
4. Sand v. Queen City Packing Co., 108 N.W.2d 448, 451 (N.D. 1961).
5. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, -, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91
(1983).
6. See Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d 791 (Ala. 1982) (promise of permanent employment
1991] 471
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A special promise causing one to rely to his detriment will set
up the possibility of a claim for promissory estoppel.7 For exam-
ple, where an employee resigns one job in reliance upon being
hired into another, he may be entitled to damages if the offer of
the second position is later withdrawn.8 However, absent consid-
eration from the employee beyond the employee's promise to per-
form, an alleged contract for permanent employment, oral or
otherwise, continues indefinitely and is, therefore, terminable at
the will of either party.9 In Albert v. Davenport Osteopathic Hos-
pital,10 the Iowa Supreme Court reiterated the general at-will
employment rule and went on to state the exception as follows:
'[A] different situation arises where there is consideration
in addition to the promise to perform services. Where
the employee furnishes consideration in addition to his
services, a contract for permanent or lifetime employ-
ment is valid and enforceable and continues to operate as
long as the employer remains in business and has work for
the employee [so long as] the employee performs
competently."'
Citing other case law, the Iowa Supreme Court specifically indi-
cated that relinquishment of other positions constituted insuffi-
cient consideration for permanent employment, as did the giving
up of opportunities for other jobs.
12
may be sufficient to preclude employment-at-will); Peters v. Alabama Power Co., 440 So. 2d
1028 (Ala. 1983) (summary judgment upon at-will defense precluded where oral contract
provided for termination "for cause"); Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc.,
663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (in part rejects statute of frauds defense to claim under implied or
oral agreements that discharge only for cause); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). But see Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hosps., 153 Cal. App.
3d 743, -, 200 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608 (1984) (statement in offer letter stating that employer
'look[ed] forward to a long, pleasant, and mutually satisfactory relationship"' did not
constitute a promise to terminate only for cause); Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West,
156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984) (standing alone, a promise of "permanent"
employment was held not sufficient to create a promise not to terminate without just cause).
7. See generally Folsom, Reconsidering the Reliance Rules: The Restatement of
Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in North Dakota, 66 N.D.L. REV. 317 (1990) (an
exhaustive study of the status of promissory estoppel in North Dakota).
8. See Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
9. See, e.g., Wadeson v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367, 371 (N.D.
1984) (North Dakota Supreme Court held that publications representing employment as a
"lifetime opportunity" and "permanent and stable business" were not promises of either
permanent employment or that an employee could be discharged only for cause). See also
Albert v. Davenport Osteopathic Hosp., 385 N.W.2d 237 (Iowa 1986); Hill v. Westchester
Aeronautical Corp., 112 A.D.2d 977, 492 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1985); Matson v. Cargill, Inc., 618 F.
Supp. 278 (D. Minn. 1985).
10. 385 N.W.2d 237 (Iowa 1986).
11. Albert v. Davenport Osteopathic Hosp., 385 N.W.2d 237, 238 (Iowa 1986) (quoting
Stauter v. Walnut Grove Products, 188 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 1971)).
12. Id. C.f Roberts v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, -, 568 P.2d 764, 769
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In contemplating an action based on oral promises, the practi-
tioner representing the employee would be wise not to attempt
some form of legalistic alchemy. The employee's subjective
impressions and assumptions are not relevant for purposes of
ascertaining contractual terms, and they are not sufficient to estab-
lish an implied agreement. 3 It has been stated that this is
"because such alleged [life-time or permanent] contracts are often
'oral, uncorroborated, vague in important details and highly
improbable,'" and general statements of company policies are not
definite enough. 4 Since general statements by an employer about
job security will create nothing more than at-will employment, the
plaintiff must show objective evidence of the employer's intent to
never terminate him and cannot rely on his own subjective
impression that he had a permanent employment contract until
retirement age.'" The North Dakota Supreme Court will appar-
ently abide by this principle of employment law, for it has held
that an "impression" of employment for a permanent-type posi-
tion does not establish a contract of employment outside the at-
will rule.' 6 These cases show the folly of depending upon the
plaintiff's understanding of the term in question to be the stan-
dard by which the decision of the employer must be made.
With these principles in mind, the plaintiff's lawyer must seri-
ously consider whether there is any point to litigation. Though the
client carries a readiness to vent his or her anger, the lawyer car-
ries the obligation of balancing the client's desire with the risks of
litigation. In the employment law field particularly, the lawyer
must assist the terminated employee with objective advice. Too
often, terminated employees have commenced litigation only to
have their hopes dashed by summary judgment, when they would
have been psychologically better off concentrating on a new
career.
(1977) (court held "longevity of service," "foregoing of another job opportunity" and
plaintiff's willingness to be transferred were insufficient consideration).
13. Armstrong v. Richland Clinic, Inc., 42 Wash. App. 181, -, 709 P.2d 1237, 1239
(1985); Roberts v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, -, 568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977). See
also Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div. of Congoleum Corp., 638 F. Supp. 726, 731 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (court did not determine whether subjective belief created an implied contract,
because even if it did, the termination was not wrongful).
14. Aberman v. Maiden Mills Indus., Inc., 414 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(citing Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 428-29, 110 N.W.2d 863,
866 (1961) (quoting Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357, 368 (2d Cir. 1959))).
15. id. at 771-72.
16. Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211 (N.D. 1987).
1991] 473
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B. IMPLIED IN FACT
Nonetheless, in the words of Sherlock Holmes, the game
would still be "afoot" and the lawyer can turn from oral promises
to an examination of written policy representations. In the 1970s,
employers had become lackadaisical in the form and substance of
policy representations to their employees. Corporations were
painting the work environment in glossy terms, publicizing the
employer's overblown opinion of the wonders of the employment
environment. Employment manuals distributed to employees
were serving as a means of demonstrating to employees that a
union collective bargaining agreement was unnecessary to secure
satisfactory wages and benefits and equitable employment proce-
dures. Lack of diligence in this process overcommitted many cor-
porations and placed them in a position from which they could not
retreat, once they were sued by disgruntled employees. The party
came to a shuddering halt with cases such as Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 7 in which it was held that a provision of an
employment contract created by the employer's written policy
statements that an employee will be discharged "for just cause
only," was legally enforceable, even though the contract was not
for a definite term.' The employer invoked the defenses of lack
of mutuality of obligation and lack of consideration without suc-
cess. In rather compelling words, the Michigan Supreme Court
stated:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies
or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such
policies and practices and makes them known to its
employees, the employment relationship is presumably
enhanced. . . . No pre-employment negotiations need
take place and the parties' minds need not meet on the
subject; nor does it matter that the employee knows noth-
ing of the particulars of the employer's policies and prac-
tices or that the employer may change them unilaterally.
It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its
own interest, to create an environment in which the
employee believes that, whatever the personnel policies
and practices, they are established and official at any
given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consist-
17. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
18. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, -, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884
(1980).
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ently and uniformly to each employee. The employer has
then created a situation 'instinct with an obligation.'19
As to the issue of consideration, the court held that employer
statements of policy can give rise to contractual rights, without
evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy state-
ments would create contractual rights. The court relied on the lan-
guage of a prior decision holding that the adoption of policies by
an employer constituted an offer of a contract, which the
employee accepted by continuing in its employment.20
The framework of Toussaint was completed by"Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille,2 l a case in which the Supreme Court of
Minnesota (without alluding to Toussaint) confirmed that a prom-
ise of "permanent" or "life-time" employment would not change
the at-will nature of the hiring.22 The Pine River court held,
nonetheless, that portions of an employer's personnel handbook
adopted after employment began could become part of the
employee's contract of employment if requirements for the forma-
tion of a unilateral contract were met.2 3 In Pine River, the bank
handbook contained standard information on employment policies
and benefits, and in a section entitled "Disciplinary Policy," pro-
vided for a three-stage procedure to be followed prior to
discharge.24
The Pine River court found that the pertinent provisions of
the handbook could become part of the terms of a unilateral con-
tract for employment and that the employee's retention of
employment constituted acceptance of the offer of this unilateral
contract when it was published by the employer.25 The court
19. Id. at -' 292 N.W.2d at 892 (footnotes omitted).
20. Id. at -' 292 N.W.2d at 892-93 (citing Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich.
568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956)).
21. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). See also Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512
So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d
170 (1984); and Wooley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985),
modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
22. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
23. Id. at 627-28, 630-31.
24. Id. at 626.
25. The court stated:
In the case of unilateral contracts for employment, where an at-will employee
retains employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions, the new or
changed conditions may become a contractual obligation. In this manner, an
original employment contract may be modified or replaced by a subsequent
unilateral contract. The employee's retention of employment constitutes
acceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job,
although free to leave, the employee supplies the necessary consideration for the
offer ....
... By preparing and distributing its handbook, the employer chooses, in
essence, either to implement or modify its existing contracts with all employees
4751991]
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skewered the proposition that when the contract is of indefinite
duration, a written job security policy is never enforceable without
additional consideration. 6 The court further found the mutuality
of obligation defense unpersuasive.
The practitioner who is seeking a contractual responsibility on
the part of the employer is addressing the implied-in-fact contract
exception to the at-will doctrine.'8 Spawned by such cases as
Toussaint and Pine River, the implied contract theory has
addressed policy statements, employee handbooks, verbal or writ-
ten representations made at the time of placement, and other
employment agreements, such as benefit plans. Traditional ele-
ments of contract law, such as bargaining and mutual assent, seem
to have been avoided by the courts under the guise of contract
interpretation. Where traditional elements of contract law
became unreliable as defenses, courts could end up interpreting
factual situations on an ad hoc basis. Whether a contract was
found could ultimately be based simply upon equitable considera-
tions. Sensing this, and determining that there was nothing left for
them but to ensure that they did not hang on their own petard,
the employer and the practical lawyer representing management
invented the employment contract disclaimer.
The court in Toussaint had noted that employers could pro-
tect themselves by entering into a written contract which explic-
covered by the handbook. Further, we do not think that applying the unilateral
contract doctrine to personnel handbooks unduly circumscribes the employer's
discretion. Unilateral contract modification of 'ie employment contract may be
a repetitive process. Language in the handbook itself may reserve discretion to
the employer in certain matters or reserve the right to amend or modify the
handbook provisions.
We conclude, therefore, that personnel handbook provisions, if they meet
the requirements for formation of a unilateral contract, may become enforceable
as part of the original employment contract.
Id. at 627.
26. Id. at 629. On this, the court stated:
While language in some of our cases may suggest otherwise, our discussion of
additional, independent consideration in Skagerberg, Cedarstrand, Bussard and
Degen was primarily in the context of the employee attempting to avoid a
discharge without cause by proving (albeit unsuccessfully in those cases) 'life-
time' or 'permanent' employment. But none of our cases purport to hold that
additional, independent consideration is the exclusive means for creating an
enforceable job security provision in a contract of indefinite duration.
Id.
27. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 626. The court simply stated, "We see no merit in the
lack of mutuality argument; as we pointed out in Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts,
297 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Minn. 1980), the concept of mutuality in contract law has been
widely discredited and the right of one party to terminate a contract at-will does not
invalidate the contract." Id. at 629 (citations omitted, italics in original).
28. "A promise may be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred
wholly or partly from conduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981).
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itly provides that the employee serves at the pleasure or at the will
of the employer or as long as his services are satisfactory to the
employer. 29 North Dakota followed other jurisdictions that allow
for prominent disclaimers30 in Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants,
Inc., where the presence of a clear and conspicuous disclaimer in
an employee handbook was found to preserve the presumption of
at-will employment. 32 In Bailey, the court settled some basic pro-
positions where uncertainty among members of the North Dakota
Bar had been driving substantial litigation. The court recognized
the proposition that the construction of a written contract to ascer-
tain its legal effect is a question of law for a court to decide, stating
that the "contract must be read and construed in its entirety and
all of its provisions taken into consideration so that the true intent
of the parties is determined."' 33 The court established, once again,
that "[i]n North Dakota when an employee is hired for an indefi-
nite term, the employment is presumed to be at will."' 34 Referenc-
ing such cases as Toussaint and Pine River, the court
acknowledged the creation in other jurisdictions of "an exception
to the presumption of at-will employment [through] promises,
express or implied, in employee handbooks with respect to job
security and termination procedures. '35 The court cited Thomp-
son v. St. Regis Paper Co.36 for the proposition" 'that employers
will not always be bound by statements in employment manuals
... [and that] [t]hey can specifically state in a conspicuous manner
that nothing contained therein is intended to be part of the
employment relationship and are simply general statements of
company policy.' ,37
In Justice Levine's specially concurring opinion in Bailey,
there appeared to be a reservation for other appropriate cases of
"issues of ambiguity and reliance created by an employer's dis-
29. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, _ 292 N.W.2d 880,891 n.24
(1980).
30. Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d 786 (1986);
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
31. 398 N.W.2d 120 (N.D. 1986).
32. Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 123 (N.D. 1986).
33. Id. at 121.
34. Id. at 122.
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
37. Bailey, 398 N.W.2d at 122 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d
219, __, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984)). It was here that the Bailey court distinguished its
holding in Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1984),
wherein it had "determined that provisions of the State Personnel Policies Manual were
binding as a part of the employment relationship between the State Laboratories
Department and [this] former state employee." Bailey, 398 N.W.2d at 122. The issue of a
disclaimer had not been raised in Hammond. Id.
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claimer in an employee handbook that purports to 'taketh' what
the remainder of the handbook appears to 'giveth', and the effect
of such ambiguity on the employer-employee relationship. 38 The
practitioner representing a former employee may be irresistibly
drawn to the issues raised in this concurring opinion, but caution
should remain the watchword unless pretrial investigation estab-
lishes the strong probability that other facts undermine the dis-
claimer. There could not have been a more compelling equitable
consideration before the court than that presented in Bailey,
where the disclaimer effectively abrogated a progressive discipli-
nary policy that admittedly had not been followed by the
employer. The justices subscribing to the minority opinion may
not be as sympathetic in cases where the employer's written obli-
gations to its employees are not as demanding. Furthermore, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has followed Bailey with Eldridge
v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society,39 which parrots
the basic propositions stated in Bailey.40 The issues suggested by
the specially concurring opinion in Bailey were restated in the
Eldridge dissent, which implied that it should be a question of fact
as to whether a disclaimer was intended by the parties to be effec-
tive.4 In view of Bailey and Eldridge, the plaintiff's lawyer must
38. Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 123 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J.,
specially concurring). Justice Levine's rather Biblical invocation warns employers to take
care lest they rely too strongly on the disclaimer. Religious lawyers representing
management are wise to counsel management to now simply remove all references to
discharge for cause as well as any step-by-step hindrances to their power to terminate. This
then becomes one of the interesting ironies of this clash between the American judiciary
and capitalistic America. Business will simply change its operating procedures to meet this
challenge, employees will lose access to favorable fair treatment policies, and the implied-
in-fact exception to the at-will rule could very well become an anachronism.
39. 417 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1987).
40. Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 417 N.W.2d 797, 799
(N.D. 1987). The court reiterated the major holdings of Bailey exactly to the effect that the
construction of a written contract remains a question of law for the court to decide, the
employment at-will rule remains alive in North Dakota, and an appropriate disclaimer will
be effective to prevent the formation of an employment contract (here again containing
progressive disciplinary rules set forth in a personnel policy handbook). Id. at 799-800.
Above the signature of the employee in the Handbook was a "Closing Statement," which
reserved to the Society the right to change or revoke the contents of the Handbook and
further stated that " '[n]o policy, benefit, or procedure implies or may be construed to
imply this Handbook to be an employment contract for any period of time."' Id. at 800.
41. Id. at 801 (Meschke, J., dissenting). The dissent did not outline whether a
disclaimer, arguably conspicuous on its face, would be considered by the jury or the court.
Nor did it outline whether such a disclaimer should be submitted to a jury with instructions
giving them the latitude to find that the disclaimer was not agreed to by the employee, but
language in the handbook relied on by the employee was considered. It would seem that
such a proposition circumvents the holdings in Toussaint and Pine River State Bank by
suggesting that an employee wishing to enforce favorable employment policies of the
employer can simply show his acceptance of this "offer" in the form of his continued
employment, but that the employer wishing to enforce the disclaimer cannot resort to the
same vehicle.
478
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proceed with caution in the face of a clear and conspicuous dis-
claimer found among the employer's written company policies.
The foreseeable difficulties of attacking handbook modifica-
tions were documented in Sadler v. Basin Electric Power Coopera-
tive.42 In this case, Sadler was laid off as part of a general
reduction in force.43 He brought action against his former
employer for "breach of his employment contract, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. ' 44 In an initial supreme
court appeal following dismissal of the entire cause of action by the
lower court in a summary judgment, the decision was affirmed as
to the implied covenant, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and remanded for a jury determination of what
the court viewed as lingering issues of fact.45
There was no evidence present that Sadler's lay-off was any-
thing more than part of the restructuring of the headquarters
group of Basin Electric, and many others shared the adverse con-
sequences of this restructuring. Yet, Sadler mounted a challenge
by contending that the original oral promises given to him by the
Cooperative and the earlier publications of the Employee Hand-
book, all of which alluded to the fact that he would not be dis-
charged except for just cause, prevented the Cooperative from
either laying him off or promulgating later publications of the
Employee Handbook referring to procedures for lay-off.46 After a
jury verdict in favor of the employer, a second appeal was taken
by Sadler in which he challenged certain jury instructions given by
the lower court.47 The North Dakota Supreme Court approved a
jury instruction addressing the right of the employer to make a
unilateral contract modification of the employment contract. 48
For the lawyer who has an employer for a client, if written
42. 431 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1988) (Sadler 11).
43. Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 431 N.W.2d 296, 296 (N.D. 1988).
44. Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 409 N.W.2d 87, 88 (N.D. 1987) (Sadler I).
45. Id. at 90.
46. Id. at 89. Lay-offs or reductions in force were not mentioned as elements of just
cause. Sadler challenged his lay-off in the face of caselaw supporting the proposition that an
employer's bona fide decision to eliminate a portion of its business for which the employee
was expressly employed constitutes "just cause" for a discharge, as a matter of law. See
Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985); Minihan v.
American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 345 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Telesphere Int'l, Inc. v.
Scollin, 489 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
47. Sadler, 431 N.W.2d at 298.
48. Id. at 300. The court found no error affording grounds for setting aside of the
verdict as to the following jury instruction:
'Unilateral contract modification of the employment contract may be a
repetitive process. Language in the handbook itself may reserve discretion to
1991] 479
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:469
personnel policies or employee handbooks are found in the work-
place and are insisted upon by the employer, disclaimer provisions
are generally advisable and can be effective in not only employee
handbooks, but also employment applications. 49 Disclaimers may
be effective in many different forms, yet a disclaimer that is
diluted in substance may cause more problems than it solves.
Regardless of the strength of the disclaimer, the employer's
authority to take adverse employment action must be clear in all
provisions of the handbook. If there are company personnel docu-
ments that may contain implicit job security promises, these docu-
ments should be scrutinized thoroughly. Disclaimers should be in
addition to, not simply in lieu of, such efforts.
C. IMPLIED' IN LAW COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
In Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Association,5" the North
Dakota Supreme Court refused to recognize the existence of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
contract.5 1 Drawing upon what it called "the emerging majority
of our sister states which have rejected the implication of a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, '52 the court held that adoption
the employer in certain matters or reserve the right to amend or modify
handbook provisions.In the case of a unilateral contract for employment, where an at-will
employee retains employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions,
the new or changed conditions may become a contractual obligation and in that
manner, an original employment contract may be modified or replaced by a
subsequent unilateral contract.'
Id.
For support for the proposition that an employer's unilateral acts in defining the
employment relationship are binding on his employees, see Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, -, 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (1984).
49. Summary judgment has been granted where an employee signed an application
form agreeing that his employment could be terminated without cause. Novosel v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980). However, diligent attention must be
paid to the language of the disclaimer placed in the application. Also, the disclaimer in the
application should not be relied on as a substitute for a disclaimer, which should be placed
in a handbook. For example, in Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666
(1985), the court gave little credence to a statement in the employment application form
that employment could be terminated without liability where an employee handbook was
found to create an express contract to terminate only for cause.
50. 407 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1987).
51. Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 214 (N.D. 1987).
52. Id. (citing Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 623 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(applying Illinois law); Parker v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 619 F. Supp. 1061
(D.D.C. 1985) (applying District of Columbia law); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and
Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985) (applying South Carolina law); Fletcher v.
Wesley Medical Center, 585 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Kan. 1984) (applying Kansas law); Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Hunt v. IBM Mid America
Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1986); Neighbors v. Kirksville
College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Murphy v. Am.
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of the implied covenant exception would effectively abrogate the
at-will rule as applied in North Dakota. The court once again cited
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 5 3 stating that "to imply into each
employment contract a duty to terminate in good faith would...
subject each discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous
concept of bad faith."
54
A limited number of jurisdictions have accepted the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 5 In Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc.,56 the California Court of Appeals addressed a case
involving a long-term employee who was discharged for alleged
theft, leaving his work area without authorization, and threatening
a fellow employee.5 7  The employee alleged that his termination
resulted from his union activities and that the company had failed
to follow its procedures for discipline and discharge. The court
held that "the longevity of the employee's service, together with
the expressed policy of the employer, operate as a form of estop-
pel, precluding any discharge of such an employee by the
employer without good cause."
58
The emergence of the remedy of an implied contract in law
presented the greatest challenge to the exercise of employer dis-
cretion in the workplace since the affirmation of a national labor
policy in the Norris-LaGuardia Act59 and its progeny. Cleary and
the few jurisdictions which initially held that such an implied cov-
enant could be found in each employment relationship had not
created the cause of action; rather, they had applied it to a whole
new field.60 Other jurisdictions sallied forth, responding to the
Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Thompson v.
St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983)).
53. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
54. Hillesland, 407 N.W.2d at 214 (quoting Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at -, 685 P.2d at
1086).
55. To date, it appears that only eight jurisdictions have given credence to the implied
covenant in varying and, in some cases, quite restrictive forms. See Mitford v. de Lasala,
666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710
P.2d 1025 (1985); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984); Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Dare v. Montana
Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984); K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39,
732 P.2d 1364 (1987); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
56. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
57. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, -, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 724
(1980).
58. Id. at -, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 1,
47 Stat. 70).
60. See generally Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A
Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw. 23 (1984). As one
commentator has stated:
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immediacy of the factual situation presented, but doing little to
clarify how the courts would arbitrate the rights of these adversa-
ries on a universal scale. Liberal incursions into this area have
become few and far between. New Hampshire adopted the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co. 61 However, Monge's formulation no longer appears to
be the law in New Hampshire.62 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,63 noting
the far-reaching implications of Monge, stated that there was no
need in that case to "pronounce [its] adherence to so broad a pol-
icy .... "64 The California Supreme Court, in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp.,65 determined that a breach of the covenant of good
faith alleges an action in contract, rather than in tort.6 6 Foley elim-
inates claims for punitive damages under this cause of action,
though it did reserve the question of the appropriate measure of
damages for breach of an employment contract.67 The faltering
history of this cause of action may be best explained as follows:
The courts which have declined to use the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to create wrongful-discharge
liability in the at-will context have done so on the ground
that the covenant's only proper use is to further and pro-
tect actual contract undertakings, not to create an
independent cause of action where none previously
existed.s8
The plaintiff's lawyer can look at the employment relation-
ship with a view towards determining whether the circumstances
Although it has been applied in a wide variety of contexts, the most notable
applications have come in the context of insurance contracts, to protect the
insured against over reaching by insurance companies, as well as in the
commercial transaction context. The courts in a few jurisdictions have borrowed
the concept and applied it in the employment-at-will context either to
rationalize liability explainable more conventionally or to create wrongful
discharge liability.
Id.
61. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
62. Lopatka, supra note 60, at 23 (citing Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295,
297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980) (reducing covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the
equivalent of the public policy exception)). See also Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
63. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
64. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, -, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257
(1977).
65. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
66. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, -, 765 P.2d 373, 396, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 235 (1988).
67. Id. at -, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
68. See Lopatka, supra note 60, at 23 n.125.
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are ripe enough to claim an implied-in-fact covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Yet this should be done mindful of the quite
unlikely prospects that such an exercise would have in a jurisdic-
tion that has declined to accept the implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Minnesota is an example of the prob-
lem. After decisively- rejecting the implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees
Federal Credit Union, 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court, approxi-
mately three months later, rather loosely stated that the court
never had "decided whether such a condition of good faith is read
into employment contracts."' 70  Despite the prompting of cases
engendered by the ambivalent nature of this statement, the Min-
nesota appellate courts continue to rigidly apply Hunt."1
III. THE TORT
It has always been an interesting question whether contract
and tort causes of action can co-exist in any particular action based
on the employment relationship. Many such actions combine con-
tract and tort allegations. Many more go to trial on only one of
those theories, because a wrongful discharge action is especially
susceptible to summary judgment.
Some torts are drawn from the common law and have been
applied to the employment relationship. They have become part
of that body known as tort exceptions to the at-will doctrine and
have, by now, become quite standardized. 2 Not all of these torts
have received the rapt attention of the courts. They contain stan-
dards that are difficult to prove and commonly require the most
compelling acts on the part of the employer.73 For these reasons,
69. 384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1986).
70. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Minn. 1986)
(citations omitted). The Minnesota Court of Appeals had recognized an implied-in-fact duty
of good faith and fair dealing in Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371,
378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (permitting an employee an opportunity to prove at trial that his
express oral contract included a term limiting his dismissal to good-faith reasons or that a
covenant of good faith was implied in his employment relationship as a result of the acts
and circumstances of the parties). Another court has classified Eklund as a promissory
estoppel case. Dumas v. Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986).
71. See Bratton v. Menard, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Makhsoos v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., No. C5-89-2080 1990 WL 92850 (Minn. Ct. App. July 10,
1990) (not reported in N.W.2d).
72. These would include the tort exceptions for the employer's violation of public
policy, defamation, the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of
fiduciary duty, tortious interference with contractual relations, fraud in the inception of the
employment contract, negligent hiring, negligent evaluation, and invasion of privacy.
73. The cause of action for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress is
typical. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) sets forth the elements for
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a lawyer representing an employee must resist the temptation to
file a complaint containing a "grab bag" of causes of action. In the
first place, the client will believe there is more to the case than
discovery ultimately shows, which causes grave problems when
the lawyer attempts to control the client during settlement negoti-
ations. Furthermore, the presence in the complaint of unsup-
ported additional allegations of this type will have little influence
on the bargaining position of experienced lawyers representing
employers. The primary tort exceptions to the at-will doctrine-
the public policy exception and defamation-are discussed below.
Other exceptions are not within the scope of this article, because
they are not found as often to be the definitive cause of action in
any employment law case and, further, because they tend to be
seen as secondary causes of action.
A. PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
There is an exception to the at-will rule when an employer
wrongfully terminates an employee in violation of public policy.
The plaintiff's lawyer would use this exception as a tort claim,
alleging wrongful or retaliatory discharge for the legal and law-
fully required acts of the employee.7"
such a cause of action. Section 46 states the following with regard to outrageous conduct
that causes severe emotional distress:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1) (1965).
Recovery will not lie unless emotional distress inflicted upon the plaintiff is so severe
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. See Bossuyt v. Osage Farmers Nat'l
Bank, 360 N.W.2d 769 (Iowa 1985); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428
(Minn. 1983); Davis v. Texaco, Inc., 210 Neb. 67, 313 N.W.2d 221 (1981). It is difficult to
present evidence that would prove the type of emotional distress for which damages can be
granted in such an action. In Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984), a former employee who "suffered humiliation and embarrassment"
when he had to tell acquaintances he was unemployed; who stayed awake worrying about
employment; who had "unsteady nerves"; who was "depressed most of the time"; who
"avoided socializing with friends and associates"; who "experienced fear about meeting his
financial obligations"; who was "unable to convey self-confidence when meeting with pro-
spective employers"; and who consulted a physician regarding his nervous condition and a
psychologist concerning stress, was found not to have suffered stress severe enough to main-
tain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with his action for
wrongful termination. The court held that the plaintiff's experience was not dissimilar to
that of many laid-off employees. Eklund, 351 N.W.2d 371, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
74. The action has been variously called a "tortious," "wrongful," "abusive," or
"'retaliatory" discharge. Generic references such as these, while a simple aid to the lawyer
and court, may be less comprehensible to the jury. These are all plaintiff's terms. The
defense lawyer would wisely seek to ensure that the court does not utilize such leading
terminology in its jury instructions or comments to the jury and that the appropriate
references should simply be that there is an allegation of "a termination in violation of a
public policy."
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Although simplistic in design, this cause of action can easily
suffer unwarranted liberties. The public policy exception gener-
ally should apply only where the reason for the adverse employ-
ment action is an act on the part of the employee which is legal
and not, itself, against public policy. The exception should not cre-
ate a new tort cause of action for an act on the part of the
employer which is already clearly illegal and against public policy.
For instance, it is correct to state that discharge with discrimina-
tory intent violates national or state public policy. However, the
re-creation of a statute-based discrimination action in the guise of
a tort exception to the at-will rule is a misapplication of the origi-
nal legal standards for this exception. 5
The public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at
will has been recognized in cases falling into several basic catego-
ries. These include retaliation by the employer in the form of dis-
charge or other adverse employment action, where the employee
has refused to perform an unlawful act.7 6 Courts have also allowed
employees to sue their employers when the employee was termi-
nated for "blowing the whistle" on the employer.7 7 Such actions
75. The employee would already have a remedy in the form of the anti-discrimination
statute. The "public policy" stated in such a law would include the procedures to be
followed by the claimant as well as the damages and penalties allowed by the law. The
approval of a redundant, common law tort remedy, in addition to this statutory remedy,
would ignore these limitations to this "public policy."
The stretch some courts may be tempted to make is exemplified by the recent case of
Western States Minerals Corp. v. Jones, No. 19697, 1991 Nev. LEXIS 17 (March 7, 1991)
(upon acceptance of rehearing, this opinion was withdrawn and superceded. Western
States Mineral Corp. v. Jones, No. 19697, 1991 Nev. LEXIS 17, reh 'g granted, 807 P.2d
1392 (1991)). In this wrongful discharge case, the majority opinion addressed the public
policy tort in Nevada. The court referenced a prior decision where it had refused to
recognize an action for tortious discharge even though the defendant had clearly violated
Nevada's public policy against age discrimination. Western States Minerals Corp. v. Jones,
1991 No. 19697, Nev. LEXIS 17, at 36-37, reh "g granted, 807 P.2d 1392 (1991) (citing Sands
Regent v. Valgardson, 105 Nev. 436, -, 777 P.2d 898, 899-900 (1989)). The court
confirmed that in Sands it had determined that in as much as a statutory remedy was
provided for persons aggrieved by employment discrimination based upon age, no court
action for tortious discharge was available to the plaintiffs. Id. The court then went on to
hold that such a cause of action would lie if an employer dismisses an employee for refusing
to work under conditions dangerous to the employee, even though the Nevada
Occupational Safety & Health Act was available, finding that the statutory remedy of the
NOSHA was far less comprehensive than the one in Valgardson. Id. at 39-40. The Nevada
Occupational Safety & Health Act provided a statutory remedy to an aggrieved employee
discharged for refusing to comply with an employer's attempted disregard for, or violation
of, that law. Id. at 63. But see Rojo v. Kliger, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. 1990) (sex
discrimination in employment may support claim of tortious discharge in contravention of
public policy).
76. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who was asked to perjure himself).
77. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982) (cause of
action stated for a discharge for disclosure of an alleged federal tax violation, including
bribery); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (action allowed where an
employee was dismissed because he had notified bank management that bank was violating
consumer credit laws); and Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880
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have also been approved when the discharge was for performance
of important public obligations78 or for exercising a statutory right
or privilege.79
North Dakota adopted the public policy exception to the at-
will rule in Krein v. Marion Manor Nursing Home.s ° North
Dakota has no cases that define the extent of this public policy
exception and has not set the parameters that would allow its
implementation. Minnesota appellate courts have recognized this
cause of action in tort when an employer discharges an employee
"for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy." 8'
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin announced in 1983 that Wiscon-
sin will recognize such an exception when an employee's dis-
charge "is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public
policy as evidenced by existing law."
8 2
The future of this tort cause of action will lie in the interpreta-
tion and scope of the term "public policy." A small minority of
states have passed "whistle blower" laws defining the scope of the
public policy that can be an element of such a cause of action. 3 .
The generalized definitions of this tort have shown their
susceptibility to varying degrees of interpretation based upon dif-
ferent factual circumstances. In Smith v. American Greetings
Corp. ,84 the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to apply the excep-
tion, because the employee alleged a dispute with his shift leader,
a pursuit of a matter not in the public interest, but merely the
redress of a private wrong.8 5  On the other hand, in Collier v.
Superior Court,8 6 a California court did apply, the exception to a
case in which the petitioner claimed he was terminated in retalia-
tion for investigating, trying to prevent, and reporting possible
illegal conduct involving the use of company products by company
(Ill. 1981) (Illinois Supreme Court applied a "retaliatory discharge" theory, holding that an
employer could be liable for compensatory and punitive damages because the tort of
retaliatory discharge is grounded in the clear and overriding "public policy [which] favors
citizen crime-fighters").
78. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (plaintiff was discharged for
making herself available for jury service).
79. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (employee
was discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim).
80. 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987) (allowing a retaliatory discharge claim for filing a
worker's compensation claim).
81. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd,
408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
82. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 561, __, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983).
83. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (1991) and MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-903 to -904
(1990).
84. 304 Ark. 596, 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991).
85. Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596, 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991).
86. 228 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 279 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1991).
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officials. The court found that petitioner's reporf to his employer
served not only the interests of his employer, but also the public
interest in deterring crime and the interests of innocent persons
who stood to suffer specific harm from the suspected illegal
conduct.87
One court refused to extend the public policy exception to
protect an employee discharged for suing his employer.88
Another has refused to approve as an element of this tort an alle-
gation of termination for having complained about a perceived
breach of the employee's employment contract.8 9 A termination
by an employer with the specific intent to harm the employee has
been found to give rise to a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge; 90 however, complaints about internal corporate conflicts
have generally not done well in the attempt to utilize this tort
action.91 The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine
appears to be firmly established as a legal principle, even though
some jurisdictions have not recognized it.
92
B. DEFAMATION
Once an almost dormant, antiquated remedy seemingly des-
tined to be used only by public figures disenchanted with their lot
at the hands of the public media, the tort of defamation has been
revived by, and has become an instrumental part of, the changing
face of employment law. Proving to be a resilient (and almost fas-
cinating) cause of action for the rejected employee, this tort rem-
edy has literally changed the way many companies operate. Both
the elements of defamation and the defenses to it have been stead-
ily evolving, largely as a result of the activity in the employment
arena. Employer prerogatives to publish management decisions,
thoughts, and opinions concerning their employees have most cer-
87. Collier v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 279 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1991).
Different jurisdictions continue to react differently to similar factual circumstances. In
Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 105 Nev. 291, 774 P.2d 432 (1989), it was held that the alleged
misconduct must be reported to appropriate authorities, not just the employer. In
Sieverson v. Allied Stores Corp., 97 Or. App. 315, 776 P.2d 38 (1989), an employee
reporting suspected wrongdoing within a corporation was held not to have access to this
tort action.
88. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 81 Md. App. 420, 568 A.2d 835 (1990).
89. Elliott v. Tektronix, Inc., 102 Or. App. 388, 796 P.2d 361 (1990).
90. Booth v. McDonnell Douglas Truck Servs., Inc., - Pa. Super. -, 585 A.2d 24
(1991).
91. See Fowler v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Littman v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 715 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Vonch v. Carlsen Cos., Inc.,
439 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
92. See Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Chem. Laboratories, Inc., 552 So. 2d 241 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1990) (reasoning that the
term "public policy" was too nebulous a term on which to base the creation of a new tort).
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tainly been restrained through judicial activism consonant with
the general progression of employee rights.
Practitioners representing either the employee or the
employer should make exactly the same analysis and investigation
when advising their client as to the risks of litigation in any case
involving a potential or realized claim of defamation. In almost
every case, an appropriate analysis would conform to the basic out-
line discussed below.
1. Determine the Exact Nature of the Action or Statement
Which Has Affected the Employee and About Which There
Is a Complaint. Compare the Alleged Defamatory Utterance
With the Common and Statutory Law of Your Jurisdiction.
The case begins with a review of the applicable statutory
law.93 Certain types of statements are defamatory per se, and the
presence of such statements would obviate the requirement to
show actual damages.94 Courts seem to divide the alleged defama-
tory statements into those that "'cannot possibly have a defama-
tory meaning; those that are reasonably susceptible to a
defamatory meaning as well as an innocent one; and those that are
clearly defamatory on their face.'"-5
2. Analyze and Make Your Own Determination (Not Accepting
the Employee's Subjective Opinion) Whether the Alleged
Defamatory Utterance Actually Tends to Harm the
Employee's Reputation or Lowers the Estimation of the
Employee in the Relevant Business or Social Community.
Part and parcel of this analysis is a consideration of whether
the defamatory utterance was a statement of fact or opinion. The
question of whether the utterance was a statement of fact or opin-
93. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02 (1987) (a statutory compilation of the common
law actions for libel or slander, and the definition of privileged communications).
94. See, e.g., Lauder v. Jones, 13 N.D. 525, 101 N.W. 907 (1904); Meyerle v. Pioneer
Pub. Co., 45 N.D. 568, 178 N.W. 792 (1920); Waite v. Stockgrowers' Credit Corp., 63 N.D.
763, 249 N.W. 910 (1933) (holding that if the language as charged fairly imputes to the
plaintiff acts or conduct which would naturally be followed by the consequence named in
the statute, it is libelous per se). If the words used were actionable per se, the law will
presume damage, and no special allegation or proof is essential to sustain an award of
damages. Meyerle, 45 N.D. 568, 178 N.W. 792; Johnson v. Neilsen, 92 N.W.2d 66 (N.D.
1958).
95. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. 1987) (quoting
Church of Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical Ass'n Found., 264 N.W.2d 152, 155
(Minn. 1978)). The court would rule as a matter of law for the defendant in the first
situation and for the plaintiff in the third. It is left to the jury to decide whether the
statement is defamatory, when it falls into the second category. See Utecht v. Shopko Dep't
Store, 324 N.W.2d 652, 653-54 (Minn. 1982).
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ion has been framed in the context of an "innocent construction"
rule-if the words are capable of an innocent construction by a
reasonable person, there can never be a per se defamation.96
Other courts have attempted to distinguish expressions of opinion,
which are not actionable even if they contain false statements,
from statements which are actionable if the "opinion" implies that
undisclosed defamatory facts are the basis of the opinion.
97
Whether a statement is considered a constitutionally protected
opinion or a fact is generally a question of law for the court to
decide.9 In Lauderback v. ABC,9 9 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that comments implying that the plaintiff was deal-
ing unscrupulously with senior citizens was protected opinion and
not an actionable statement that implied undisclosed defamatory
acts.' 00 References to a letter as being "senseless drivel," "gross
injustice," "a factually incorrect assertion," and "crass insult" have
been held to constitute opinions only.' 0 ' "Expressions of opinion,
rhetoric, and figurative language are [also] generally not actiona-
ble if, in [a proper] context, the audience would understand the
statement as not a representation of fact."'0 2 In order for a state-
ment to be actionable, it must be capable of conveying a defama-
tory meaning to the person "receiving" the communication.' 3
Termination itself is not a false publication, and any inferences
that may be drawn by third parties as a result of the termination
do not make it defamatory. 104
96. Marczak v. Drexel Nat'l Bank, 186 Ill. App. 3d 630,_, 542 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1989).
97. True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986).
98. Gernander v. Winona State Univ., 428 N.W.2d 473,475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The
Eighth Circuit has stated that summary judgment might be particularly appropriate with
regard to a fact versus opinion question and that when the utterance constitutes an opinion
and does not suggest undisclosed facts altering the average listener's interpretation of that
opinion, summary judgment should be granted. See Lauderback v. ABC, 741 F.2d 193, 198
(8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985).
99. 741 F.2d 193, 197 (8th Cir. 1984).
100. Lauderback v. ABC, 741 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1984).
101. Erven v. Provost, 413 N.W.2d 861, 862 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
102. Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 390 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986). An opinion is actionable only if it implies an allegation of undisclosed defamatory
facts as the basis for the opinion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
103. See, e.g., Dubrovin v. Marshall Fields & Co. Employee's Credit Union, 536 N.E.2d
800 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (escorting a terminated employee from his desk to the door and
having his personal belongings inspected by a security guard do not on their face impute
the commission of a crime or lack of integrity).
104. Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 409 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D. 1987).
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3. Determine as Closely as Possible With the Facts at Hand
Whether the Alleged Defamatory Utterance Was True or
False.
The burden of proving the falsity of the alleged defamatory
utterance remains with the employee. 10 5 Truth remains an abso-
lute defense to a defamation action 10 6 and truth or falsity will usu-
ally be a jury issue.
10 7
4. Determine the Occasion Upon Which the Communication
was Made and Analyze Whether it Would Meet the
Requisites of a Qualified or Absolute Privilege.
Privilege is a matter of defense' 08 and must be affirmatively
pled. 109 Employers have an absolute privilege for communica-
tions they make in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceed-
ings.110 This form of privilege can be lost if the privileged
communication is published outside the confines of the
proceeding."'
A conditional or qualified privilege exists when a person pub-
lishes a statement in good faith about a subject in which he has an
interest or duty and the publication is limited to those who also
have a legitimate interest in the subject matter.1 2 This qualified
privilege, like the absolute privilege protecting statements made
in judicial proceedings, is based on the public policy consideration
of encouraging the free flow of information in settings such as the
employer-employee relationship."' However, employers may be
105. Jadwin, 390 N.W.2d at 440 n.1; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47
(1974). See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
886 (Minn. 1986); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980).
106. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888; Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 255; Soentgen v. Quain &
Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73, 78 (N.D. 1991).
107. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 889; Tsudek v. Target Stores, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 466, 469
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
108. Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. 1986); McCurdy v.
Hughes, 61 N.D. 235, 237 N.W. 748 (1931); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D.
525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Minn.
1987); Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1991).
109. Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
110. Webster v. Byrd, 494 So. 2d 31, 34 (Ala. 1986); Stafney v. Standard Oil Co., 299
N.W. 582 (N.D. 1941); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-05 (1981).
111. Webster, 494 So. 2d at 35. It has been held that some administrative
investigations or other proceedings do not always contain sufficient procedural safeguards
for an absolute privilege. McDermott v. Hughley, 317 Md. 12, -, 561 A.2d 1038, 1044-45
(1989).
112. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-05(3) (1981) (defining privileged communications).
113. See McKinney v. K-Mart Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (S.D.W. Va. 1986);
Hebner v. Great Northern Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 80 N.W. 1128 (1899). See also Schneider v.
Pay 'N Save Corp., 723 P.2d 619 (Alaska 1986); Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan. 1, 722
P.2d 1106 (1986); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 569 A.2d 793 (1990);
Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 149 Wis. 2d 913, 440 N.W.2d 548 (1989).
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liable for defamation actions based upon intra-company communi-
cations." 4 The defense of qualified privilege may not work in a
case in which there has been a compelled self-publication of the
-defamatory utterance. This element of defamation was recog-
nized for the first time in Minnesota in Lewis v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society."' In Lewis, the reason for termination was
never communicated by the company to anyone; however, the
plaintiffs themselves informed prospective employers, when asked
why they had left their previous employment, that they had been
terminated for gross insubordination." 6 The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed a jury award, holding that "the publication require-
ment may be satisfied where the plaintiff was compelled to publish
a defamatory statement to a third person if it was foreseeable to
the defendant that the plaintiff would be so compelled.""' 7
5. Search for Evidence That Might Demonstrate Malice on the
Part of the Employer.
Malice can be the touchstone to punitive damages."" A two-
step approach has been used to analyze a qualified privilege. The
court first determines whether the occasion for the statement is a
matter of qualified privilege and, if so, whether the exercise or use
of the privilege was proper (i.e., is the privilege overcome by mal-
ice, bad faith, or abuse?)." 9 It has been held that there is no quali-
fied privilege to tell customers that the employee was fired
because he dealt with stolen parts, when there was no evidence
the stolen parts had been passed along to customers and the cus-
114. Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 143-44 (Minn. 1986). See also
Harvet v. Unity Medical Center, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
numerous intra-corporate communications establishing the publication element); Rickbeil
v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 23 N.W.2d 247, 256-57 (N.D. 1946) (dictation of libelous letter
to a stenographer not privileged).
115. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986). The doctrine of compelled self-publication was
described in Lewis as that which "does no more than hold.the originator of the defamatory
statement liable for damages caused by the statement where the originator knows, or
should know, of circumstances whereby the defamed person has no reasonable means of
avoiding publication of the statement or avoiding the resulting damages .... Id. at 888.
116. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 886
(Minn. 1986).
117. Id. at 888.
118. See, e.g., McKinney v. K-Mart Corp., 649 F. Supp. at 1220-21 (S.D.W. Va. 1986);
Navorro-Monzo v. Hughes, 297 Ark. 444, -, 763 S.W.2d 635, 637-39 (1989).
119. See Garziano v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 385-87 (5th Cir.
1987) (content of a company bulletin on sexual harassment policy and termination of
employee for sexual harassment held to be a privileged communication when distributed to
company supervisors and employees, but could be unprotected if bulletin delivered by
company to persons outside the circle of protection); Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic,
P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73, 78 (N.D. 1991).
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tomers had no interest or duty to hear the communieoation. 120
Likewise, the publication of alleged sexual harassment to fellow
employees has been held to never qualify as the kind of employee
"evaluation" considered privileged. 12 1 On the other hand, volun-
tary publication by the plaintiff to a third party can be a defense.
For instance, if the plaintiff employee takes a polygraph test, and
the results are communicated to the employer and various persons
within the corporate hierarchy, the signing of a polygraph release
and consent waiver has been found to be a voluntary consent,
even if the employees feared losing their jobs for refusal to sign.
122
There does not appear to be any uniform approach to setting
the standard of malice which must be applied to overcome a con-
ditional or qualified privilege. The historical approach is to use the
"actual malice" (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
truth or falsity) definition as set forth in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 23  Another approach is to utilize a common law defini-
tion to the effect that malice exists where the statement was made
from ill will and improper motives or recklessly and wantonly for
the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.' 24 Meeting the malice stan-
dard is not easy. A corporate employer's failure to investigate has
been held to be insufficient, standing alone, to support a finding of
malice, although it can be an important factor.1
25
Employers can be held vicariously liable for defamatory state-
ments made by their employees. 26 It has been held that even the
malicious intent of the employee is imputable to a new employer
where the employee wrote a letter to clients of his former
120. Shannon v. Taylor AMC/Jeep, Inc., 168 Mich. App. 415, _ 425 N.W.2d 165, 167-
68 (1988).
121. Gonzalez v. CNA Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
122. See, e.g., Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1361, 1366-68 (W.D. Ky. 1988).
123. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
124. See Harvet v. Unity Medical Center, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988); Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73, 79 (N.D. 1991).
125. Burger v. McGilley Memorial Chapels, Inc., 856 F.2d 1046, 1052-53 (8th Cir.
1988). In Burger, the owners of a funeral home made no attempt to verify the statement by
a single check of available records; that, coupled with other factors, showed reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. Id. at 1053-54. See Babb v. Minder, 806
F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 380-81
(Minn. 1990) (employer who does not investigate, but instead relies on accusations made by
biased employees or on unidentified hearsay, has not acted as a reasonably prudent person
would and lacks reasonable grounds for making a defamatory statement).
126. See, e.g., Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, __, 773 P.2d 1231, 1238
(1989) (employer can be vicariously liable for compensatory damages regardless of
employer's culpability and can also be liable for punitive damages for the employee's
defamatory statement if the employee was acting within the scope of employment and the
employer participated in, authorized, or ratified the tortious conduct). See also Rouly v.
Enserch Corp., 835 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1988); Brannan v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 516 So.
2d 157, 171 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
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employer in which the employee said "bad things" about the for-
mer employer."17
IV. PREEMPTION
In the increasingly complicated world of employment law,
procedural traps are present to ensnare the unwary. One of these
is the doctrine of preemption which, in some cases, might be avail-
able to invoke the precepts of federal labor law or federal benefits
law in place of the state-based claims of the plaintiff. The defense
lawyer who is attuned to the doctrine of preemption has some
time (albeit a very short time if the case is to be removed to fed-
eral court) in which to cofisider whether the doctrine would be
advantageous. The trap will spring shut on the plaintiff's lawyer if
no thought has been given to whether the case can be won under
applicable federal common law.
A. FEDERAL LABOR LAW
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947128 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties. 129
A long history of case law has established that this section provides
federal jurisdiction over controversies that involve collective-bar-
gaining agreements and also authorizes federal courts to fashion a
body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective-bar-
gaining agreements. 130 The preemptive effect of Section 301 was
set forth in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 131 where the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he dimensions of sec-
tion 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of fed-
eral labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the
127. John D. Robinson Corp. v. Southern Marine & Indus. Supply Co., 196 Ga. App.
402, -, 395 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1990).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
129. Id.
130. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
131. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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statute."1 32 Therefore, the lawyer representing an employee who
is subject to a collective-bargaining agreement and who wishes to
commence an action based on state common law, must consider
the exposure to a preemption defense.
A series of Supreme Court cases has defined the requirements
to which the facts of any particular case can be applied. 133 An
excellent discussion of the principles developed by these cases is
found in Barbe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,134 in which the
court considered an action brought by an employee against her
former employer for defamation and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.' 35 The court concluded, at separate points in this
discussion, as follows:
Lingle thus instructs for this case that in order to
decide whether plaintiff's claims are preempted by § 301,
this Court must determine whether resolution of plain-
tiff's claims of defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress require an interpretation of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
Under a proper preemption analysis, therefore, the
first step is to recognize the essential elements of the state
law tort claims, in this case defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and against the elements
so identified, determine whether the state law claim can
be resolved without interpreting or depending on the
proper interpretation of the collective-bargaining
agreement. 36
The court in Barbe found in favor of the defendant on the
issue of whether these two state common law causes of action are
preempted by this federal labor law. The court stated as follows:
The Court accordingly concludes that two issues in
the defamation suit, i.e., publication and the defense of
privilege, require interpretation of the collective-bargain-
ing agreement, and their resolution is 'dependent on
analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' The reso-
132. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
133. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987); and Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399
(1988).
134. 722 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Md. 1989).
135. Barbe v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 722 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (D. Md. 1989).
136. Id. at 1260.
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lution of the elements of the state law claim are thus inex-
tricably intertwined with the definition of the adjustment
and arbitration process contained in the collective-bar-
gaining agreement and with an understanding of the rela-
tive interests of the union, the employer and the
employee in communicating employee discipline actions.
Whether the notice of termination for 'dishonesty'
was reckless, extreme or outrageous will depend on
whether Barbe's conduct was in violation of the agree-
ment relied upon as the basis for the termination. If A &
P complied with and satisfied the terms of the agreement,
then Barbe would be hard-pressed to urge that the con-
duct was outrageous.
13 7
As a result of this analysis, the court in Barbe granted the motion of
the defendants for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff
had not exhausted grievance and arbitration procedures estab-
lished by the collective-bargaining agreement and, further, that
the plaintiff had not brought the action within the section 301 six-
month statute of limitations.'
38
The preemption issue has received varying results in both the
United States Supreme Court and the circuit courts. In Lingle v.
Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 139 the Court found no pre-
emption of a state law claim of wrongful discharge for filing a
worker's compensation claim, holding that the claim did not impli-
cate or require interpretation of the terms of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. 140 In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,14 1 the
Court held that, for purposes of removal to federal court, section
301 does not necessarily preempt all state law claims based on
alleged "private" agreements entered into between employees
and their employer at a time when the employees are not mem-
bers of the collective-bargaining unit. 42 State law claims for
wrongful discharge have been found to be preempted, 43 as have
cases involving claims of misrepresentation14 4 and infliction of
137. Id. at 1262 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 1263.
139. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
140. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988).
141. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
142. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1987).
143. See, e.g., Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1988); Newberry v.
Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988).
144. See, e.g., Martin v. Associated Truck Lines, 801 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1986).
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emotional distress. 145
In Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. ,146 a union employee was
terminated for violating plant rules, after co-workers reported that
he had slashed the tires on one of the co-workers' cars in a com-
pany lot.' 47 The employee filed a grievance under collective-bar-
gaining procedures, and an arbitrator sustained his grievance,
ordering him reinstated with back pay. 4 8 A complaint was filed in
Missouri state court alleging slander, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, malicious prosecution, libel, and wrongful dis-
charge.149 Holding that section 301 preempted the claims for
slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations, libel, and wrongful discharge,
the court found that the claims of malicious prosecution and false
arrest did not require reference to the collective-bargaining
agreement. 50
Anderson v. Ford Motor Co. '5 1 involved a claim by employees
(laid off because of lack of seniority) that the company had assured
them when they were hired that they would not be "bumped" by
individuals on a preferential hiring list.15 2 The employees alleged
that their termination was contrary to this promise not to termi-
nate them and constituted both fraud and a breach of their com-
mon law oral employment contract.1 5 3 The court rejected the
argument that section 301 preempts these claims, finding signifi-
cant the fact that the alleged promises were made before the
plaintiffs became employees of the company and before they were
covered by the collective-bargaining agreement.1 54
B. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW
If the employee is covered by health or welfare benefit plans
under the auspices of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA),' 55 the preemption defense may once again be avail-
able. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,15 6 the United
145. See, e.g., Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1985).
146. 876 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1989).
147. Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 1989).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 625.
151. 803 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1011 (1987).
152. Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2d 953, 954-55 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1011 (1987).
153. Id. at 955.
154. Id. at 958-59.
155. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
156. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
496 [Vol. 67:469
CHANGING FACE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
States Supreme Court held that allegations of breach of contract
(for discontinuance of disability benefits), retaliatory discharge (for
filing worker's compensation claim), and wrongful termination of
disability benefits were preempted and that the state court case
was properly removable to federal court. 57 The Court held that
all of the employee's claims were preempted because the claims
related to an employee benefit plan under section 514(a) of
ERISA.' 58 Because the employee was a beneficiary under ERISA
who benefitted from a covered plan, the suit fell under section
502(aX 1Xb), which provides an exclusive federal cause of action for
resolution of such disputes.' 59 Metropolitan Life has apparently
provided the foundation for removal of employment lawsuits in
which the denial of benefits is a possible motive for the employee's
termination.' 60 However, arguments to the effect that a removal
to federal court is dictated whenever an employee's lawsuit either
seeks to recover damages for value of fringe benefits covered by
ERISA or requires a calculation of benefits under an ERISA plan
have not been successful. 16 '
C. STATE STATUTES
There may also be state statutory preemption of state com-
mon law claims. A state statute may provide an exclusive adminis-
trative remedy for a violation and thus preempt common law
claims or private civil actions. 162 Claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress may be preempted when a worker's compensa-
tion statute provides a remedy for the conduct alleged to have
been the cause of the employee's emotional distress.' 3
157. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987).
158. Id. at 62.
159. Id. at 66-67.
160. See, e.g., Treadwell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 278, 282-83
(D. Mass. 1987) (ERISA preempted state public policy claim when plaintiff alleged
defendants terminated him in order to deny retirement plan benefits). Cf U.S. Telecom,
Inc. v. Hubert, 678 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (D. Kan. 1987) (federal district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over employer's declaratory judgment action regarding any claim by
employee that employer dismissed employee because of his age and desire to avoid
payment of pension benefits).
161. See, e.g., Ethridge v. Harper House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1405 (9th Cir.
1988); Schultz v. National Coalition of Hispanic Mental Health & Human Servs. Orgs., 678
F. Supp. 936, 938 (D.D.C. 1988).
162. See, e.g., Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1987) (where it was held that an employee's claim for retaliatory discharge was preempted
by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act when an employee filed a complaint
against her employer alleging sex discrimination). But see Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc., 416
N.W.2d 714, 716-17 (Minn. 1987) (a claim for retaliatory discharge for filing a complaint
under the Minnesota Occupational Safety & Health Act was stated where the Act did not
expressly preclude other relief).
163. See Flynn v. New England Tel. Co., 615 F. Supp. 1205, 1209-10 (D. Mass. 1985);
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V. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
When a lawyer representing an employee is presented with a
case in which the employee has voluntarily quit, the plot thickens
considerably. If the employee is still employed but states a desire
to quit and bring legal action for some alleged wrongdoing, the
lawyer must take care not to become part of the problem. The
employee may not want to continue working, but the focus cannot
be on how the plaintiff feels; rather, it must be on whether or not a
reasonable person in that position would return to work. 164  The
lawyer must never advise the employee to leave employment,
unless firmly convinced that the physical or psychological well-
being of the employee is at stake. The ramifications for employees
are simply too onerous to blithely risk their livelihood through a
contrived discharge.
The idea that there can be a constructive discharge first devel-
oped in National Labor Relations Act decisions and followed in dis-
crimination cases, chiefly in the federal courts. It generally refers
to instances in which a plaintiff can prove that any reasonable per-
son would have concluded that it was necessary to resign his or her
employment because the employment circumstances made fur-
ther work impossible. Difficulties for the plaintiff are shown in the
case of Spear v. Dayton's,165 where the court found it unnecessary
to decide a constructive discharge claim premised upon a resigna-
tion prompted by a demotion because age was not a factor in the
decision to demote. The same conclusion was reached in Frazer v.
K.F.C. National Management Co.,166 where the employee was
demoted and transferred to a job that entailed less responsibility
but no decrease in salary or benefits.
A constructive discharge only occurs when an employer delib-
erately causes or allows an employee's working conditions to
become so intolerable that the employee has no other choice but
to quit 6 7 or when a reasonable person in the employee's shoes
would have felt compelled to resign.' 68 In Continental Can Co. v.
Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308
(1987).
164. Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1991).
165. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 267, 270 (D. Minn. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 733 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1984) (summary judgment on the age discrimination claim
was reversed).
166. 491 F. Supp. 1099 (M.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 363 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1981).
167. Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1991).
168. Jenkins v. Southeastern Mich. Chapter, Amer. Red Cross, 141 Mich. App. 785, 369
N.W.2d 223 (1985); LeGalley v. Bronson Community Schools, 127 Mich. App. 482, 339
N.W.2d 223 (1983).
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State,' 69 which involved a sex discrimination claim under the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act, the employee alleged a constructive dis-
charge as a result of the employer's failure to act in response to her
complaints of sexual harassment. 70 The court held that a con-
structive discharge can occur "when an employee resigns in order
to escape intolerable working conditions caused by illegal discrimi-
nation.''7 The result was different in Shea v. Hanna Mining
Co.,172 where four plaintiffs brought claims of age discrimination
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and alleged constructive
discharge because the employer had pressured them into taking
early retirement in an effort to make reductions in its work
force. 173 The court affirmed the lower court's decision that the
employees had resigned voluntarily and held that an employee is
not constructively discharged whenever she elects to leave a job




Employment law is a complex field that will expand and con-
tract in response to intense socioeconomic dialogue, as the rights
of employees and employers are endlessly debated. Nevertheless,
recognized contract and tort remedies now provide a settled body
of law to which the litigants can refer. All this, as well as the con-
tinumg and protracted refinement of these remedies, mandates
that assiduous attention be given by the practical lawyer to the
changing face of employment law.
169. 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
170. Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. 1980).
171. Id. at 251. See also Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks and Sewer Dep't, 802
F.2d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 1986) (constructive discharge exists if employee establishes that
employer acted with intention of forcing employee to resign and employer created
working conditions that reasonable- person would find intolerable).
172. 397 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
173. Shea v. Hanna Mining Co., 397 N.W.2d 362, 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
174. Id.
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